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Governance Structures for Local Economic Development in Croatia 
- Abstract - 
Who should take care of local economic development in Croatia? This question seems trivial; 
however, there are still some open questions. According to current legislation, local economic 
development is an administrative task of the 21 counties, the current units of regional self-
government. On the other hand, the cities and municipalities as units of local self-government 
regularly get involved in economic development activities, though this is not directly defined 
in the legislation. There is a contradiction concerning development capacity of cities and 
counties.  Cities  attract  population  and  economic  activity  and  are  usually  stronger  than 
counties  in  terms  of  financial  and  human  resources  that  are  necessary  for  economic 
development activities.  
This  research  questions  if  the  existing  administrative-territorial  setup  and  functions  of 
counties in Croatia correspond to the needs of economic growth and development on local 
level. It is also intended to get some insights from concepts that derive from trade theory, 
location theory and economic geography. Governance relations between bigger cities and 
counties  in  fostering  local  economic  development  in  Croatia  will  be  examined.  For  this 
purpose, local and regional data will be analyzed and through the discussion on existing 
governance structures, qualitative insights on the appropriateness of the current situation will 
be presented. The main goal of this research paper is to find quantitative and qualitative 
justification  for  an  appropriate  governance  structure  for  fostering  local  economic 
development in Croatia. 
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Introduction 
The thesis of this paper rests on the assumption that the existing administrative-territorial 
setup and functions that derive from the related legislation in Croatia are not in accordance 
with the needs of economic growth and development on local level. The main goal of this 
research  paper  is  to  find  quantitative  and  qualitative  justification  for  an  appropriate 
governance structure for fostering local economic development in Croatia. With the aim to 
investigate current local governance problems in Croatia, the focus of this research is on 
relations  between  bigger  cities  and  counties  in  promoting  and  fostering  local  economic 
development. 
Croatian counties are responsible for fostering and promoting economic development on local 
level. At the same time, even though not formally stated in any of the fundamental legal 
documents, most of the cities (towns) and many municipalities are very active in promoting 
local economic development. Naturally, the stronger cities and towns are the driving forces in 
local  economic  development  in  Croatia,  whereby  the  competence  of  the  counties  in  this 
domain can be questioned. In practice, governance problems are  visible and can be seen 
through conflicts, competitive behaviour based on local politics, lacking communication and 
cooperation, causing waste of scarce resources, inadequate support, duplication and neglect of 
those who really need support. Regional development theories such as trade theory, location 
theory and new economic geography can give some insight into spatial aspects of economic 
activities,  as  well  as  more  contemporary  approaches  to  polycentric  development  that  are 
currently discussed among experts and academics in the European Union (EC, 2004). Besides 
the  economic  focus  on  development  such  as  promoting  growth  and  competitiveness,  the 
adequacy of the institutional structures and modes of governance as a crucial development 
aspect is now widely recognized. 
The theoretical overview is presented in the first chapter of this paper. The second chapter is 
devoted to the institutional analysis of the existing administrative-territorial setup, functions 
and  competences  of  the  local  governments  in  Croatia.  This  is  the  basis  for  identifying 
shortcomings  of  the  current  governance  structures  for  local  economic  development.  The 
analysis of economic activity on local level is presented in the third chapter of this paper. 
Whereby, due to lack of data on the level of local self-governments, the analysis is based on 
data  for  counties.  According  to  theory  as  well  as  practice,  some  units  of  local  self-
government,  particularly  bigger  cities,  attract  population  and  economic  activity  and  have 
therefore  more  strength  and  capacity  in  supporting  economic  development  activities  than   3
counties. This is mostly evident through fiscal data, which exists for all local governments. 
Therefore, the fourth chapter is devoted to the analysis of fiscal capacity for local economic 
development. The fiscal analysis is focused on the case of three counties and their respective 
county centers (economic and/or  administrative), namely Sisak-Moslavina County (central 
Croatia); Šibenik-Knin County (southern Croatia); and Virovitica-Podravina County (eastern 
Croatia). The fifth chapter is devoted to the concluding discussion on the local economic 
governance structures in Croatian counties and their internal economic development relations 
with  the  county  centers,  whereby  the  insights  gained  from  the  analytical  part  on  the 
appropriateness of the current situation are presented. 
1.  Some theoretical insights for local and regional economic development 
1.1 Specificities of locations in regional development theory 
In theory, development relations between economic centers and its regions are the central 
consideration  of  the  very  broad  spectrum  of  local  and regional  economic  theories.  These 
theories evolved primarily during the 20th century embedded in trade theory, location theory 
and economic geography. Even though these theories were criticized and even considered as 
not adequate in certain periods towards the end of the past century, a certain revival of the 
basic concepts is occurring again, particularly in Europe. They are viewed now through a new 
lens  in  the  context  of  spatially  oriented  economic  development  policy  that  focuses  on 
competitiveness, networking and collaboration. In addition, these developments can also be 
recognized in the concepts of territorial cohesion and polycentric development which are put 
forward by European planning and regional development experts and scientists.  
Some  of  the  old  theories  still  provide  arguments  for  development  strategies  and  many 
strategies  target  sectoral  or  regional  poles.  According  to  Myrdal’s  (1957)  cumulative 
causation theory, some markets and places or nodes attract capital and skilled labour force 
accumulating competitive advantages compared to other locations. He also stressed that less 
developed  regions  can  have  advantages  from  growth  in  developed  regions  due  to  spread 
effects that derive from diffusion of innovations in lagging regions and rise in export markets 
for products from these lagging regions. However, there is a tendency that the benefits will be 
set off by backwash effects that occur because of movement of capital and labour from the 
lagging regions  towards  the  more  prosperous regions.  Dawkins  (2003)  explained  that  the 
results of free trade among regions actually reinforce the process of cumulative causation, 
whereby growth is further catalyzed in the more developed regions on expense of the lagging 
regions.  Another  famous  theory  is  Perroux’s  (1950)  growth  pole  theory  based  on  his   4
perception of firms and industries viewed in space as a web being linked by centripetal forces. 
According  to  growth  pole  theory,  economic  development  strategies  should  focus  on 
investments  in  a  certain  growth  pole  or  sector,  in  order  to  initiate  development.  He  also 
suggested that through adequate policies urban centers in a multi-regional context can become 
growth poles. Growth pole theory was also criticized because of unbalanced benefits that 
derive from implementation of such strategies as benefits initially flow into the growth pole, 
but at the relative expense of other parts of the economy. Consequently, groups in other 
sectors or parts of the region or national economy become impatient, since benefits trickle 
down  into  sectors  or  regions  with  a  certain  time  lag.  Dawkins  however  stressed  that  the 
application  of  growth  pole  strategies  was  abandoned  during  the  1980’s  because  of 
implementation  failures  of  such  policies  which  were  supposed  to  initiate  new  growth  in 
lagging  regions.  The  emphasis  on  the  process  of  structural  change  within  growth  poles 
through time was missing.  
A further significant contribution came from Hirschman (1958) who focused on backward 
and forward linkages between firms, and made his research on how polarized development 
could benefit a growing region and its environment. He also put forward the view that growth 
in a developed region produces favourable trickle-down effects in lagging regions because 
developed  regions  buy  their  products  and  employ  their  labour  for c e .  A  f u r t h e r  o f t e n  
mentioned model is Friedmann’s (1966) center-periphery model. He referred to the traditional 
export  base  theory  of  economic  growth  and  stressed  the  important  role  of  local  politics, 
economy  and  leadership  as  well  as  the  impact  of  the  development  history  of  the  region. 
According to Friedmann, big urban areas have actually an initial advantage in competing for 
new  growth  because  of  the  advantages  of  lower  urbanization  costs  of  such  economies. 
According to this theory, all factors are in favour of central regions, and regions outside the 
center differ according to their relative autonomy of their economy. 
Location theory, which was initially introduced by Alfred Weber in 1929 and later developed 
in  the  1960s  by  Walter  Isard,  questions  primarily  through  mathematical  models  why 
economic activity is not equally spatially distributed and looks at factors that firms consider 
when selecting a certain geographic location. According to this theory firms locate in the way 
as to minimize costs, maximize opportunities to reach markets in order to maximize profits. 
Stimson, Stough and Roberts (2002) added that significant attention was given to transport 
costs,  labour  costs  and  other  production  costs,  scale  of  operation  and  agglomeration 
economies.  Besides  these  factors  that  are  still  important,  over  time,  attractiveness  and   5
business climate, as well as networking possibilities became also important for firms in their 
decisions on where to locate. A further important theory is agglomeration theory or external 
economies of scale. Armstrong and Taylor (2000) explained that agglomeration economies 
emerge on the basis of economic association of a big number of economic activities that do 
not necessarily need to be within the same industry. Concentrations of a big number of firms 
are created that together serve various industries, including for example urban transport and 
communication,  well  organized  labour  markets,  social  and  public s e r v i c e s ,  c u l t u r a l  a n d  
recreational activities, firms organized in clusters and geographic concentration of innovative 
activities. All this contributes to the attractiveness of existing centers or growth poles creating 
a cumulative process of growth. They recognized also that this can have negative impacts on 
the less developed regions through backwash effects (e.g. skilled labour migrating to more 
prosperous regions), causing negative cumulative causation effects. In addition, polarization 
and fast growth can also result in external diseconomies (or negative externalities) such as 
congestion, pollution, rising factor costs and living expenses.  
An older often quoted theory is Christaller’s central place theory published in 1933, which 
rests  on  the  notion  that  centralization  is  a  natural  principle  of  order  and  that  human 
settlements follow it. He suggested that there are laws determining the number, size and 
distribution of towns. This theory relied on two concepts, i.e. every good or service will have 
a  range  (maximum  distance  consumers  are  prepared  to  travel  to  acquire  goods)  and  a 
threshold (minimum market needed to bring about the selling of a particular good or service). 
According to Christaller, urban settlements are ordered according to a hierarchical structure of 
central places of various sizes and functional complexity, and in every larger region exists a 
systematic spatial order of central places (urban settlements). The various functions, which 
these central places offer, reflect the variety of economic activity that serves the surrounding 
population.  The  main  criticism  of  this  theory  is  that  it  was  based  on  the  assumption  of 
isotropic  places  in  which  density,  purchasing  power  and  consumer  preferences  are 
homogenous. In reality, density and socio-economic characteristics of consumers significantly 
differ through space.  
One  of  the  newer  models  is  Krugman’s  (1991)  core-periphery  model  embedded  in  new 
economic geography which is linked also to newer trade theories. He stressed that the regional 
clustering of economic activities occur due to a combination of centrifugal (immobile factors, 
land  rent/commuting,  congestion  and  other  pure  diseconomies)  and  centripetal  forces 
(linkages,  thick  markets,  knowledge  spillovers  and  other  pure  external  economies).  The   6
pattern of core and periphery is defined in the way that the total manufacturing industry will 
be located in the core, while the total agricultural production will be located at the periphery. 
This is sustainable with big internal economies of scale, low transport costs, and with a large 
share of regional population which is employed in the manufacturing industry. 
The  briefly  presented  theoretical  overview  represents  the  fundaments  of  contemporary 
regional development theory, though the focus has shifted more towards the complex relations 
of  competitiveness,  cohesion  and  sustainability.  For  the  purpose  of  this  paper  the  main 
theoretical  points  such  as  concentration  and  agglomeration,  as  well  as  the  importance  of 
institutions and structural considerations are mentioned. Further, the economic importance of 
certain locations (regions) and their developmental effects (positive as well as negative) on 
the surrounding territory are recognized. The next section is devoted to the second but crucial 
aspect of local and regional economic development, namely the theoretical background of the 
popular concept of governance. 
1.2 The levels of governance 
Though there are numerous definitions of governance today, depending also on the context, 
one of the often quoted definitions is the one put forward by UNDP. Accordingly, governance 
can be defined as “the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to manage 
a society's affairs” (UNDP, 1997). While the economic, political and administrative aspects of 
governance are often the focus, recognition of the need for a more holistic concept is growing. 
Therefore,  governance  comprises  mechanisms,  processes  and  institutions  through  which 
collective decisions are made and implemented, citizens, groups and communities pursue their 
visions, articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate 
their  differences.  As  defined  in  this  manner,  it  emphasizes  the  nature  and  quality  of 
interactions among social actors and between social actors and the state. 
Scientific and professional discussions on the issue of multi-level governance have intensified 
during  the  1990’s  that  can  be  linked  to  the  integration  and  expansion  processes  of  the 
European  Union.  With  the  formulation  of  common  policies  on  EU  level,  more  complex 
interrelations  and  requirements  for  the  implementation  of  development  policies  between 
different levels of government are occurring. Carmichael (2002) stressed that “government” 
became more variegated within different levels of government (i.e. horizontally differentiated 
or  provided  by  multiple  agencies).  In  addition,  government  is  also  geographically  more 
diverse (i.e. vertically differentiated or conducted on multiple levels). Therefore, multi-level 
governance stresses the complexity of policy making, implementation  and  responsibilities   7
among different governmental and societal actors in their activities on supranational, national, 
regional, local as well as quasi-governmental institutions. While  government  activities  go 
more in the direction of regulating public activities and to a lesser extent the redistribution of 
funds.  Changes  in  governing  towards  multi-level  governance  are  primarily  the  result  of 
changes  in  the  modes  and  nature  of  public  sector  activities.  Multi-level  governance  has 
changed the relation between policies and service delivery, and the emergence of different 
tiers of government complicated the process of policy making. Therefore, the coordination of 
services  through  several  functional  areas  and  levels  of  government  is  becoming  more 
problematic.  Tensions  are  also  growing  between  the  static  territorial  space  and  dynamic 
functional space creating also difficulties in governing. Hooghe and Marks (2003) pointed out 
that  the  dispersion  of  governance  throughout  several  jurisdictions  actually  stimulates 
flexibility. They also stressed that centralised government can not answer all needs that derive 
from variety. While through multi-level governance decision makers can adjust the levels of 
governance and provide better for requirements that derive from heterogeneity. 
Local and regional economic development (LED), as defined by the World Bank (2001) is a 
process in which local and regional governments co-operate with the public and business 
sector as well as with the civil society with the aim to facilitate better conditions for the 
economic growth and the creation of employment. It offers local and regional government, the 
private sector, the non-profit sectors and the local community the opportunity to mutually co-
operate in order to improve the local economy. LED encompasses many different disciplines, 
such as planning, economics, and marketing. It also encompasses many local and regional 
government  and  private  sector  functions  including  planning,  infrastructure  provision,  real 
estate development and finance. Good governance on the local level as defined by Romeo 
(2002) is an institutional system for managing local public affairs, characterized by three 
critical dimensions: 
¾  Performance  of  the  local  authorities  (fiscal e f f o r t  a n d  d i s c i p l i n e ,  a l l o c a t ive  and 
operational efficiency) in managing public resources and discharging their responsibilities 
for  delivery  of  economic  and  social  services,  protection  of  the  environment  and 
management of natural resources, and promotion of economic development;  
¾  Participation of organized and individual citizens in local public sector decision-making, 
through mechanisms that supplement and enhance, rather than replace or contradict, the 
functioning of the institutions of democratic representation; and    8
¾  Partnership between local authorities, civil society organizations and private sector units 
for the provision and production of local collective goods and services.  
He stressed also that the adoption of good local governance practices depends upon changes 
in the policy, legal and regulatory framework governing political, administrative and fiscal 
decentralization of public sector powers, responsibilities and resources, and the role and status 
of civil society and private sector associations and organizations; as well as the build up of 
local governments’ capacity along three dimensions: individual, institutional and systemic 
capacity. Importantly, the build up of local government capacity is understood as a demand-
driven  process.  Crucial  aspects  of  this  process  are  the  creation  of  financial  and  other 
incentives  for  local  governments  to  invest  in  the  building  of  their  own  capacity,  and  the 
establishment of clear local government accountability both “upward” to the national level 
and “downward” to their constituencies with related systems for administrative and social 
monitoring  and  auditing.  As  it  is  expected  that  good  local  governance  has  impacts  on 
improved  services  delivery  and  local  economic  development,  it  is  evident  that  it  is 
complementary to and not in conflict with the local self-government functioning. Having a 
good legislative framework in place for local self-governments is, although fundamental, only 
one precondition for local development. Another dimension to be considered is how do local 
self-governments work with this legislation, how do they practically implement all the rights 
and responsibilities they have. The next part is hence devoted to the institutional structures for 
governance in Croatia. 
2.  The Croatian institutional framework for local economic governance 
2.1 The administrative-territorial structure 
Formed in the early 1990s Croatia is a relatively new state and is consequently in the process 
of  local  and  regional  reformation.  This  includes  not  only  changes  in  administrative  and 
territorial  arrangements,  but  also  reforms  connected  with  the  decentralisation  and 
concentration-reduction issues. Furthermore, Croatia’s application to the European Union has 
also initiated numerous other adjusting activities. 
The  legislative  framework  of  the  local  and  regional  self-government  in  Croatia  was 
established in 1992 with the introduction of the local government system. In the following 
years, different reforms of the territorial and institutional framework occurred. Consequently, 
in 2001 a new Law of Local and Regional Self-Government (LLRSG) was adopted, where 
counties  were  clearly  defined  as  the  units  of  regional  self-government,  while  cities  and   9
municipalities remained units of local self-government.  Today, the Republic of Croatia is a 
unitary state with 20 counties referred to as regions, and the capital city of Zagreb, which has 
a County and City status. Sumpor (2004) stressed that until 2001 counties had dual functions 
and were primarily responsible for performing delegated tasks from the national level, while 
neglecting to a certain extent their own self-government role. The existence of basically two 
kinds  of  public  administrations  on  county  level,  i.e.  the  devolved  RSGs  and  the 
deconcentrated  national  government  offices  on  county  level,  created  a  somewhat  unclear 
institutional structure on this level of government. Even though counties are referred to as 
regional governments in Croatian legislation, they are actually too small to be considered as 
regions in European terms, and belong in fact to the local government level (NUTS III level). 
As Croatia is in the preparatory process for accession to the European Union, the Croatian 
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) initiated a consultation process on possible scenarios for 
dividing Croatia into NUTS II regions. Scenarios ranging from one, four or five regions are 
still  discussed  in  Croatia.  Statistical  regions  would  be  comprised  of  a  number  of 
administrative regional units, i.e. counties. But, a national consensus and decision on the most 
adequate division can only be achieved through the national political process.  
The  Local  Self-Government  (LSG)  level  is  comprised  of  124  cities  or  towns  and  426 
municipalities, while the precise number of LSGs increases frequently (CBS, 2004). Besides 
the major cities in Croatia such as Zagreb, Split, Rijeka, Osijek, or Varaždin most of the cities 
are actually towns. However, the terminology in the Croatian legislation does not make a 
distinction between these two terms. The city or town is a unit of local self-government with 
more than 10,000 inhabitants, constituting a unitary urban, historical, natural, economic and 
social space. The vast majority of towns have less than the minimal number of inhabitants, 
since the Law prescribes a list of exemptions under which a municipality can gain a town 
status. The municipality is a unit of local self-government, consisting of the territories of 
several  inhabited  places  representing  a  natural,  economic  and  social  entity,  and  which  is 
connected by the common interests of its inhabitants.  
Decentralisation is based on three core principles of local government: autonomy (or liberty); 
democracy (or participation); and, effectiveness. The structure of territorial organisation that 
can be observed across different countries may be viewed as a reflection of the national focus 
on one of these values over the others. Thus, a large number of smaller local units can be 
viewed as a preference for autonomy or democracy, while fewer, larger local units would tend 
to express the value of effectiveness. (Pigey et al., 2002)   10
2.2 The size and population of units on different levels of government 
The Republic of Croatia covers 56.5 thousand km
2 of continental surface and has a population 
of  4.4  million  inhabitants  (Census,  2001).  The  total  number  of  571  local  and  regional 
government units in comparison with the population of 4.4 million does not say much. But 
knowing  that  from  1990  the  number  of  LSGs  increased  five  times  and  that it constantly 
increases regardless  of  the  fact that  many  of  the  existing LSGs  are  unable to  fulfil  their 
functions (many being highly dependent on central government grants, it can be stated that 
this is not sustainable in the long run. 
The internal structure of distribution of local governments by population size is an important 
factor  to  consider.  The  Croatian  population  density  average  is  78  inhabitants  per  square 
kilometre.  The  analysis  of  the  county  organization  further  reveals  significant  differences 
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have  less  than  1,000  inhabitants.  But  regardless  of  the  actual  size,  LSGs  have  the  same 
responsibilities and accomplish the same functions. 
The  percentage  of  population  living  in  county  centres  indicates  concentration  of  urban 
population. Five out of 20 counties (except City of Zagreb) have more than 40% of population 
concentrated in county’s centre. The regional gross domestic product (RGDP) estimates by 
counties show great differences between counties. For example, 53.1% of the national GDP 
was produced in only 4 counties: City of Zagreb (30.1%), County of Primorje-Gorski Kotar 
(8.1%) and County of Split-Dalmatia (7.9%) and County of Istria (6.3%).  
2.3 Functions of local and county governments in Croatia 
According  to  the  LLRSG,  units  of  local  self-government  should  perform  tasks  of  local 
importance, which directly address the needs of citizens, and which are not assigned to state 
bodies by the Constitution or by law. It is interesting to note that economic development, as a 
task is not explicitly mentioned as a task of local government, but as a task of counties. 
However, LED can be considered as a task of local importance. Croatia has a significant 
number of municipalities that are actually far too weak to perform legally required functions 
and  tasks  on  their  own.  Such  municipalities  regularly rely  on  support  and  transfers  from 
higher  levels  of  government.  The  regional  self-governments,  i.e.  counties  should  perform 
tasks of regional importance, especially tasks that relate to: education; health care; spatial 
planning;  economic  development;  transit  and  transport  infrastructure;  development  of 
educational, medical, social and cultural institutions. In addition, cities that have more than 
30.000 inhabitants can take over some of the county services, if they have sufficient resources 
for  their  provision.  In 2001,  as  a  part  of  the ongoing  decentralization  process,  32  of  the 
stronger local and all regional self-governments gained greater responsibilities in education, 
health and social care, for which they receive also fiscal support through an equalisation fund.  
The LLRSG only lists general mandatory functions of local and regional governments. While 
detailed responsibilities are defined in a broad number of special laws and by-laws. However, 
due to the vast number of such laws, by-laws and regulations, frequent changes, amendments 
as well as new regulations, difficulties occur in the implementation on local level. Many of 
these regulations are conflicting, contradictory, lacking of transparent financial flows and are 
often neglected by the responsible levels of government, leading to poor or even no provision 
of specific public services. The reason for this derives primarily from the fact that the many 
shared responsibilities between the various levels of government, from national to local, are 
not clearly defined. Therefore, it is useful to gain a better understanding on the nature of   12
various functions. According to Sumpor (2004), functions of local self-governments can be 
categorised into three main groups, which can be: 
¾  the sole responsibility of local governments, e.g. pre-school, housing and utilities – the 
delivery of such services depends entirely on own fiscal and human resources of the local 
government; 
¾  shared responsibility with regional governments, e.g. recreation, culture and religion – the 
delivery of such services depends on the capacities of the local as well as the regional 
governments, particularly their cooperation and communication; 
¾  shared responsibility with the regional as well as central government, e.g. general public 
services,  elementary  education,  social  security  and  welfare,  mining,  industry  and 
construction, roads, other economic affairs and services – the delivery of such services 
depends very much on bottom-up and top-down relations. 
All three groups show specific needs and problems of local governments in providing public 
services  according  to  their  functional  responsibility.  Major  problems  arise  when  local 
governments depend on other levels of government. If the problem of fragmentation is taken 
into account as well as unclear legislation, significant efficiency problems occur. Also, the 
still  quite  centralized  Croatian  Government,  it  is  impossible  to  target  all  needs  through 
standard top-down decisions. While communication on real needs from below is difficult due 
to inexisting mechanisms. On the other hand, counties, as an intermediary level between the 
local and the national level, are administratively as well as fiscally still too weak to be the 
balancing level in the provision of public services. The mentioned problems are less pressing 
in the more developed, administratively and economically stronger local governments (i.e. 
cities/towns), which are also more eager to take over new responsibilities. 
3.  Analysis of the local economies and economic governance in Croatia 
3.1 Employment and active companies across sectors and counties 
First of all, economic data on county level has to be treated carefully and the results are only 
indications, as most of the data is based on estimates. Also, data on the level of local self-
governments is not collected by the Croatian central bureau of statistics. The lack of local data 
is a serious problem faced in Croatia and is an obstacle for performance measurement on any 
level of government. However, in this chapter the available economic data on county level is 
presented, while in the next chapter some indications on the relations between counties and 
cities will be presented based on fiscal results available for all local government units.   13
The structure of employed persons by groups of activity shows that in 2001 most employed 
persons  or  43.1%  of  total  employment  by  sectors  were  in  services  (incl.  construction, 
wholesale and retail trade, hotels, restaurants, transport and communications, financial and 
real estate services), and another 24.2% were employed in the public sector. While, 29.4% 
worked  in  the  secondary  sector  (manufacturing)  and  only  3.3%  in t h e  p r i m a r y  s e c t o r  
(agriculture).  When  analyzing  the  employment  structure  across  counties,  significant 
deviations  from  the  national  averages  can  be  seen  in  the  least  developed  counties  like 
Vukovar-Sirmium,  Virovitica-Podravina  and  Lika-Senj,  which  show  also  higher  shares  of 
employment in the primary sector (above 11%). 
The unemployment rate in the Republic of Croatia, i.e. the ratio of unemployed persons to the 
total  economically  active  population,  was  20.4  %  in  2001.  At  cou n t i e s ’  l e v e l  t h e r e  w e r e  













Source: Republic of Croatia, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook 2002. 
An unemployment rate above national level was arrived at by ten counties; it varied between 
22.6%  in  County  of  Lika-Senj  and  31.1%  in  County  of  Šibenik-Knin.  The  lowest 
unemployment rate was reached in the County of Međimurje (12.1%) and County of Krapina-
Zagorje (13.5%). 
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In  2001  there  were  more  than  175  thousand  active  legal  entities  registered  in  Croatia 
(companies, crafts, trades and free-lance), wherefrom more than 51% were registered as crafts 
and free lance. When analyzing the number of active legal entities across counties, most 
companies were concentrated in the City of Zagreb (27%), followed by the County of Split-
Dalmatia (11%), the County of Primorje-Gorski Kotar (9%), and the County of Istria (8%). 
The lowest number of active legal entities in 2001 was registered in the County of Lika-Senj 
(1,579), and the County of Požega-Slavonia (2,038). According to sectors, more than 70% of 
active legal entities were registered in the service sector.  
3.2 Economic performance on county level 
In 2001 Croatia’s GDP amounted to USD 19.9 billion or USD 4,486 in per capita terms (at 
current exchange rate). Based on estimates of the regional gross domestic product (RGDP) by 











Source: Lovrinčević, Ž. et al (2004); CRORPI data base, Institute of Economics, Zagreb. 
The RGDP varied between USD 0.2 billion in the County of Lika–Senj and 6.1 billion in the 
City of Zagreb. According to that estimation, RGDP per capita of the Croatian capital city 
Zagreb was 76.3 percentages above the national level in 2001. GDP per capita above the 
national level has also been reached in County of Istria (34.6 percentages above) as well as 
the County of Primorje-Gorski Kotar (17.5 percentages above), which are both in northern 
coastland of Croatia. While in 17 out of 21 counties, GDP per capita was actually below 
national average. The county results reflect also that those counties, mainly in the north-
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western  part  of  the  country,  with  the  most  advanced  and  economically  developed  urban 
centers (Zagreb, Rijeka, and Pula) have the highest RGDP per capita. This supports the thesis 
that the concentration of infrastructure, business services, skilled labour, and higher housing 
standards are located within the major urban centers.  
Total exports of goods in the Republic of Croatia amounted to USD 4.5 billion. At the same 
time, imports of goods were USD 7.6 billion. This resulted in the quite problematic foreign 
trade deficit amounting to USD 3 billion, which was more than 15% of GDP. The coverage of 
imports by exports was at 60% only. On county level, only seven counties reached a positive 












Source: Lovrinčević, Ž. et al (2004); CRORPI data base, Institute of Economics, Zagreb. 
Interestingly, among those only Istria is one of the more developed counties, while the other 6 
counties with a trade surplus were among the least developed counties (Sisak-Moslavina, 
Virovitica-Podravina,  Požega-Slavonia,  Koprivnica-Križevci,  Krapina-Zagorje  and  Lika-
Senj). At the other end is the city of Zagreb with the highest trade deficit of USD 2.2 billion 
(or more than 70% of the total national  trade  deficit).  Zagreb’s share of imports in total 
Croatian imports was 33% and the share of exports was 48.2%. The smallest contribution to 
the national foreign trade made the County of Lika-Senj with exports being only 0.1% of 
national exports and imports that were only 0.02% of total national imports. These trade 
results show also an interesting development, as significant trade deficits are generated in the 
more populated and economically more developed counties with strong urban centers.  


































































Exports: 1,486 mil. USD
Imports: 3,641 mil. USD  16
3.3 Local economic governance in Croatia 
Based  on  a  recently  conducted  study  on  local  economic  development  policy  in  Croatia, 
important insights were gained on the current state of affairs. Generally, Croatian legislation 
referring  to  sectors  of  the  economy  is  prepared,  adopted  and  managed  on  national  level. 
Whereas,  measures  and  regulations  are  implemented  either  directly  top-down,  through 
deconcentrated national institutions and government offices, or through delegation of tasks to 
local  and  regional  self-governments.  Laws  and  regulations  with  strong  spatial  economic 
effects are broadly defined on the national level. Their implementation is managed across 
levels of government which are supposed to cooperate. Local and regional self-governments 
are commonly viewed as promoters and supporters of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) on their territory. While, big industry is commonly in the domain of the national 
government and regulated through the national institutional and legal framework.  
Croatian LSGs are active in local economic development in two ways varying according to 
fiscal  strengths,  available  human  resources  and  political  stability:  through  promotion  of 
economic  development  based  on  proactive  approaches;  and  through v a r i o u s  m e a s u r e s  f o r  
economic development. In addition, local and regional self-governments can either design and 
offer their own programs and measures, or obtain information on programs offered by others. 
Since 2001, a significant number of local and regional economic development initiatives in 
Croatia were promoted and financially supported by the former Ministry of Crafts, Small and 
Medium  Enterprises  (merged  with  the  Ministry  of  Economy  in  2004).  In  addition, 
communication  and  interaction  between  the  existing  and  emerging  domestic  and  foreign 
business related institutions is of crucial importance and recent developments demonstrate 
vivid and lively activities in SME development. Recent LED initiatives in Croatia include 
local government incentives (lower surtax on income tax, tax on unused land, utility charges 
and contributions), financing local economic entities (annual credit lines), business support 
initiatives (over 30 public and private entrepreneurial centers and nine business incubators 
established), provision of  business related infrastructure (business zones), establishment of 
networks  and  associations,  and  promotion  of  human  resources  development  (certified 
educational programs, trainings and seminars). 
LSG administrations can levy taxes, use part of the national tax which is shared with local 
budgets, levy charges and take loans. Quite a few underdeveloped municipalities can also 
count on external financing, which may be obtained from the national budget or from various 
international sources. The funds collected in this way can be used for a number of economic   17
development incentives. Acting directly, the LSGs can decrease certain local taxes or defer 
charges. They can also give exemptions of fees for a limited period of time. Through national 
fiscal  legislation,  tax  incentives  (exemptions)  have  been  defined  for  businesses  which 
establish  themselves  in  LSGs  or  communes  included  in  areas  of  special  state  concern 
(affected by war and underdeveloped areas), in mountain areas or on islands. Here, LSGs 
cannot act directly, but have the possibility to inform entrepreneurs and businesses who wish 
to set up operations. Tax incentives are usually combined with the development of industrial 
and commercial or mixed zones. The main promoter, the Ministry of Economy launches loan 
programs in cooperation with selected banks and offers them to municipalities/towns rather 
than to entrepreneurs. This requires that the LSG has a high level of fiscal capacity as well as 
a capable administration, which is able to assist in the implementation and monitoring of a 
well elaborated project or program. However, there are very few LSGs in Croatia that can 
actually meet these requirements.  
Directly  and/or  indirectly,  LED  is  managed  by  all  three  levels  of  government.  Larger 
municipalities/towns and all 21 counties have departments that deal with the economic issues. 
Ministries  that  are  in  charge  of  administering  various  aspects  of  overall  development 
(environmental protection, spatial planning, reconstruction, finances etc.), have their offices at 
the county level and in some 100 LSGs. There are also the state owned enterprises which 
implement  their  plans  mainly  at  the  local  level.  Finally  there  are  municipal  courts  and 
municipal cadastre departments, which are unavoidable steps in every local economic venture. 
The  institutions  that approach  and assist  potential  entrepreneurs  are,  besides the Croatian 
Chamber of Economy and Croatian Chamber of Crafts, with their regional and local offices, 
also some associations of LSGs and emerging local development agencies. 
4.  Analysis of the fiscal capacities for local economic development 
4.1 Fiscal analysis based on the consolidated general government data 
As mentioned before, fiscal data provides the only and somewhat more reliable quantitative 
information source for the analysis of the relations between counties and cities/towns. Based 
on demographic and economic data, primarily collected and presented on county level, it can 
only be assumed that the main economic poles in Croatia remain the bigger urban county 
centers across the country such as Zagreb, Split, Rijeka, Osijek, or Varaždin. It can be stated 
that local governments, which are more developed and have economic advantages due to 
concentration of businesses, are therefore in a better position to collect more own revenues as   18
well as revenues from shared taxes. These are in Croatia, like in other countries, naturally 
mainly larger urban areas. 
The economic and administrative strength of the major urban centers was also considered 
with the first phase of decentralization, which was initiated in 2001. An analysis of the fiscal 
capacity of local self-government and administration units in the period 1999 – 2000 was 
conducted for that purpose by using a number of indicators with a view to obtaining relevant 
indicators of the real state of affairs in the local self-government financing system. The 2000 
indicators, obtained by an empirical analysis of fiscal capacity and the ratio between current 
revenues and current expenditures for the basic functions to be performed by each local self-
government unit, suggest that 184 municipalities and cities (or more than 30%) were unable to 
cover their current expenditures by current revenues. (Perko-Šeparović et al., 2003) However, 
the study does not address in detail the sizes of local governments nor whether the local 
governments actually provide all legally foreseen services. The weaker LSGs therefore either 
rely on central government transfers or simply do not provide the mandatory services. 
For the initiation of the decentralization process, 32 cities/towns (out of a total of 546 units of 
local  self-government  in  2001)  and  21  counties  were  selected  to  take  over  new 
responsibilities. Due to the initiated reform process and difficulties with implementing new 
procedures and information technology systems in most of the local governments, fiscal data 
for all local governments is still not publicly available. However, the Croatian Ministry of 
Finance managed at least to publish aggregated data on the consolidated general government 
budget outturn for 2001-2003. These data refer to the central government and extra-budgetary 
funds outturn, and local data for 53 units that entered the first phase of decentralization in 
2001. The consolidated general government total revenues were between 46-47% of GDP in 
2001-2003,  while  expenditures  and  lending  minus  repayments  exceeded  total  revenues 
resulting in an overall deficit of around 3% of GDP every year in the period. Some policy 
changes occurred during that period. The central government revenues increased from 32% in 
2001 to almost 39% of GDP in 2003, while central government expenditures show an even 
more significant change from 26% in 2001 to 38% of GDP in 2003. These changes are the 
result of a change in fiscal policy in 2001 regarding extra-budgetary funds, when the central 
budget took over expenditures as well as revenues for pension insurance contributions. An 
additional policy change occurred in 2002, when the revenues and expenditures for health 
insurance and employment contributions were integrated into the State Treasury system.    19
As mentioned before, Croatia is a highly centralised country, which can be confirmed on the 
basis of two important indicators: the share of revenues of local self-governments in GDP and 
the share in the total government budget revenues. In 1999, the share of local budget revenues 
in consolidated revenues of the general government budget was 10.3% (or 5.4% GDP). In 
2000, the year before the launch of the first phase of decentralisation, the share of local 
budget revenues in consolidated revenues of the general government budget was 10.9% (5.2% 
GDP). The 2001-2003 fiscal data for the local level (based on local 53 units) does not show 
any significant change during that period, where revenues rose only from 4.1% and 4.7% of 
GDP, and expenditures rose from 4.3% to 5.2% of GDP in the period 2001-2003. The deficit 
of local governments increased slightly from 0.2% to 0.5% of GDP in the same period. These 
results  show  that,  even  though,  the  decentralization  process  was  initiated,  no  significant 
changes in the local fiscal data occurred.  
In Croatia, as in the most other countries, local and regional economic development is not an 
obligatory function of local and regional government. Although local and regional economic 
development is a duty of many institutions at national, regional and local level, the majority of 
activities  regarding  development  of  municipalities,  cities  and  counties  refer  to  the  fiscal 
capacity  of  sub-national  government  to  promote  their  own  development.  Sub-national 
government units do not have enough capital revenues to finance capital expenditures. This 
means that financial sources for the majority of development activities at local and regional 
level  come  from  grants,  donations  and  borrowing  (domestic  financing).  If  we  take  into 
account the Croatian statistics (budget, GDP, and unemployment) and achieved level of LED 
in Croatia, the current status of LED in Croatia is, to a great extent, faced with financial 
constraints for local and regional units in the promotion of local economic development. 
4.2 Fiscal capacity of the local government in Croatia 
The analysis of the fiscal capacity of the local level in Croatia has still some real limitations, 
as the last complete fiscal data publicly available is for the year 2001. Based on such data, 
only indications on possible trends can be made (see Appendix Table 1). On aggregate level 
for  all local  governments,  the  share  of  cities or  towns  in  total  revenues  was  73%,  while 
counties  had  only  a  share  of  13%.  With  regard  to  capital  revenues  as  well  as  capital 
expenditures, the most significant share is generated by the cities or towns. At the same time, 
counties received 49% of the total grants for all local governments, which confirms that they 
have a significant need for additional financing. Also, contrary to the counties, the LSGs 
managed to reach a coverage indicator above 1. Concerning the administrative capacity, from   20
the data on employed persons in local government administration, it is clear that cities or 
towns  dominate  as  well  with  66%  of  public  officials  working  in  the  city  or  town 
administrations (in counties only 10%).  
When comparing the indicators for the counties of Virovitica-Podravina, Šibenik-Knin and 
Sisak-Moslavina  and  the  respective  county  centers,  the  findings  that  derived  from  the 
aggregates further confirm the assumption that the counties are weak compared to cities. In all 
three counties, the total revenues of the cities or towns significantly exceed the total revenues 
of  the  respective  county  self-governments.  While  the  city  of  Šibenik  and  city  of  Sisak 
managed to collect alone more revenues than their county. The somewhat lower revenues 
collected in the city of Virovitica can be explained by their weaker economic structure. All 
three cities show that they manage to cover their current expenditures with current revenues, 
while all three counties show significant difficulties in that part of their budget management. 
The share of capital revenues in the total of the cities of Šibenik and Sisak show, that more 
than 70% was collected in the county centers alone. Virovitica shows again a significantly 
lower share (39%). At the same time, the counties collected very low or even zero income 
(Šibenik-Knin) from capital revenues. The expenditure side shows similar relations between 
the counties and their centers. Concerning employment in the public administrations, all three 
cities have more staff than their counties. The most significant share of public administration 
staff on the territory of the county is in Šibenik (57% of the total).  
5.  Concluding remarks on local economic governance structures in Croatia 
The thesis of this paper was that the existing administrative-territorial setup and functions that 
derive from the related legislation in Croatia do not comply with the needs of economic 
growth and development on local level. With regard to the theoretical overview and based on 
the quantitative analyses as well as qualitative comments presented in the preceding chapters, 
the cities or towns that keep the position of the county economic center are clearly stronger 
and more able to take care of local economic development than the county administrations.  
The main points highlighted by old as well as newer theories such as cumulative causation, 
agglomeration and economy of scale effects are relevant and can be seen in Croatia. The cities 
frequently mentioned as the strongest like Zagreb, Rijeka, Split, Osijek, or Pula are in fact 
regional growth poles and have the respective function and role in relation to the surrounding 
regions (as recognized in the central place or core-periphery models). To a lesser extent, but 
still valid, this applies also to the second range cities analyzed in this paper like Virovitica, 
Sisak or Šibenik. Their strength in comparison to counties was confirmed by the fiscal data.   21
However, due to the missing institutional links (formal and informal), political instability and 
low level of collaboration, all the negative development effects recognized in theory like the 
backwash  effects,  drain  of  skilled  labour  or  the  time  lag  in  trickling-down  are  visible 
throughout Croatia. By ignoring the importance of the development role of the urban centers 
and relying entirely and only on the competence of institutionally weak counties (without 
administrative history), it is not surprising that local economic governance structures are not 
adequately set up to foster and promote development throughout the country.  
In general, many local economic governance problems today are related to certain legislative 
omissions in the past, when counties were introduced into the system of local governance 
without more serious analyses and preparations, which is also true for the Law on local and 
regional self-government. The definition of responsibility for local economic development in 
the legislation refers only to counties, while at the same time the role of counties remains 
unclear. This can be also related to the territorial division which is still strongly influenced by 
politics, whereas expert analyses and warnings on the current system of local governance are 
ignored. In addition, counties are considered to be too small and too weak to be considered as 
regions in EU terms (NUTS II), while discussions on the introduction of a new (NUTS II) 
regional level are heating up. At the same time, the significance and strengths of the urban 
centers was completely neglected in the past 15 years. An additional severe problem for better 
local economic governance derives from inadequate official and uneven individual regional 
and local statistics seriously needed for monitoring local government performance. 
In governance terms, interrelations and interdependencies between the counties and county 
centers were neglected by policy throughout the entire period. Furthermore, political as well 
as  personal  animosities  and  certain  competition  between  these  two  governance  levels 
contributed further to the difficulties faced by many local self-governments and counties. 
Unbalanced development throughout the Croatian regions is mostly visible, when comparing 
the data for Zagreb and the remaining part of the country. This has definitely negative impacts 
on economic development of the whole country. It should be mentioned that there are good 
experiences and examples in local economic governance in Croatia, but they are visible in the 
mentioned stronger LSG, and the success is to a large extent based on individual efforts. 
Some of the LSGs in Croatia have had the opportunity to gain more experience in building 
partnerships, networking as well as broader citizen participation in the public sector, primarily 
through foreign technical assistance projects. Such experiences should serve Croatia further 
on its way towards improving local economic governance structures.    22
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I. TOTAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT - 
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA 9.961.437.514 8.317.120.358 683.608.397 960.708.759 9.900.758.113 7.122.067.422 2.602.804.761 175.885.930 1,17 10.446
COUNTIES - TOTAL (RSG) 1.271.078.943 792.644.952 8.848.965 469.585.026 1.220.840.423 833.740.718 276.307.803 110.791.902 0,95 1.042
- % in total local government 13% 10% 1% 49% 12% 12% 11% 63% 10%
CITIES/TOWNS -TOTAL (LSG 1) 7.262.862.300 6.468.451.951 557.636.872 236.773.477 7.245.360.849 5.369.995.999 1.831.373.298 43.991.552 1,20 6.868
- % in total local government 73% 78% 82% 25% 73% 75% 70% 25% 66%
MUNICIPALITIES - TOTAL (LSG 2) 1.427.496.271 1.056.023.455 117.122.560 254.350.256 1.434.556.841 918.330.705 495.123.660 21.102.476 1,15 2.536
- % in total local government 14% 13% 17% 26% 14% 13% 19% 12% 24%
II. VIROVITICA-PODRAVINA COUNTY - 
TOTAL (RSG + LSG 1 + LSG 2) 114.674.410 76.977.801 4.089.596 33.607.013 110.698.570 73.640.399 26.259.843 10.798.328 1,05 144
COUNTY - TOTAL (RSG) 35.862.882 14.488.903 18.053 21.355.926 35.038.818 17.070.453 8.482.411 9.485.954 0,85 23
- % in county total 31% 19% 0% 64% 32% 23% 32% 88% 16%
CITIES/TOWNS -TOTAL (LSG 1) 50.028.130 39.190.152 3.626.736 7.211.242 49.194.897 37.280.541 10.914.356 1.000.000 1,05 52
- % in county total 44% 51% 89% 21% 44% 51% 42% 9% 36%
MUNICIPALITIES - TOTAL (LSG 2) 28.783.398 23.298.746 444.807 5.039.845 26.464.855 19.289.405 6.863.076 312.374 1,21 69
- % in county total 25% 30% 11% 15% 24% 26% 26% 3% 48%
City of Virovitica 28.286.272 23.108.096 1.590.017 3.588.159 27.790.052 21.055.945 5.734.107 1.000.000 1,10 28
- % in county total 25% 30% 39% 11% 25% 29% 22% 9% 19%
III. ŠIBENIK-KNIN COUNTY - TOTAL 
(RSG + LSG 1 + LSG 2) 184.078.370 128.498.342 5.687.524 49.892.504 179.583.783 133.198.171 40.722.631 5.662.981 0,96 477
COUNTY - TOTAL (RSG) 43.141.663 21.703.515 0 21.438.148 41.307.326 33.712.606 2.357.974 5.236.746 0,64 45
- % in county total 23% 17% 0% 43% 23% 25% 6% 92% 9%
CITIES/TOWNS -TOTAL (LSG 1) 105.741.720 84.284.547 4.642.579 16.814.594 104.786.309 78.050.181 26.312.293 423.835 1,08 342
- % in county total 57% 66% 82% 34% 58% 59% 65% 7% 72%
MUNICIPALITIES - TOTAL (LSG 2) 35.194.987 22.510.280 1.044.945 11.639.762 33.490.148 21.435.384 12.052.364 2.400 1,05 90
- % in county total 19% 18% 18% 23% 19% 16% 30% 0% 19%
City of Šibenik 62.209.476 53.406.447 4.053.075 4.749.954 62.209.476 45.330.195 16.475.446 403.835 1,18 270
- % in county total 34% 42% 71% 10% 35% 34% 40% 7% 57%
IV. SISAK-MOSLAVINA COUNTY - 
TOTAL (RSG + LSG 1 + LSG 2) 340.018.838 254.283.070 15.065.391 70.670.377 322.238.919 259.598.791 61.744.016 896.112 0,98 404
COUNTY - TOTAL (RSG) 59.193.343 29.493.617 1.009.806 28.689.920 57.367.960 55.196.564 490.612 1.680.784 0,53 42
- % in county total 17% 12% 7% 41% 18% 21% 1% 188% 10%
CITIES/TOWNS -TOTAL (LSG 1) 214.329.336 180.684.987 13.152.481 20.491.868 202.618.796 164.147.473 39.859.695 -1.388.372 1,10 234
- % in county total 63% 71% 87% 29% 63% 63% 65% -155% 58%
MUNICIPALITIES - TOTAL (LSG 2) 66.496.159 44.104.466 903.104 21.488.589 62.252.163 40.254.754 21.393.709 603.700 1,10 128
- % in county total 20% 17% 6% 30% 19% 16% 35% 67% 32%
City of Sisak 108.609.495 94.555.737 11.502.634 2.551.124 102.954.421 79.744.893 22.909.528 300.000 1,19 82
- % in county total 32% 37% 76% 4% 32% 31% 37% 33% 20%
Source: Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Finance, on-line publication [www.mfin.hr]; authors calculations.  